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Abstract of the paper 
We  use  original  data  to  assess  if  the  current  incentives  to  farmer  turnover  may  help  the 
competitiveness of small farms in the Lazio Region (central Italy). Our results show that substantial 
changes in the policy may be needed.  
The paper analyzes sharp declining trend in small farm number, discusses its causes and evaluates 
the policies that have been adopted to stop or slow down this downfall. The regional policy makers 
consider the aging of the farmers is a key determinant of the decline of small farms. Consequently, 
they  have  designed  an  incentive  policy  to  generational  turnover  mainly  based  on  installation 
payments. Given our empirical findings we conclude that this policy may fail to achieve the stated 
objectives.  Firstly, farms that had a generational turnover in the last seven years do not show higher 
propensity to investment than the control group. These results suggest that farmers’ turnover per se 
may fail to increase the competitiveness of small farms. Secondly, in almost half of the cases the 
change in ownership is the result of a long process. Thus the timing of the policy may be wrong. 
Thirdly the policy is difficult to monitor and opportunistic behavior is possible. 
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Between 2000 and 2007, the number of farms in Central Italy decreased by 28.5% with a spike of 
36,7% in the Lazio Region (source ISTAT). This general trend is driven by a sharp reduction of the 
number of small farms (i.e., less than 5 hectares, the average farm size in Italy is 6.4 hectares), 
which can be dramatic in local areas. For example, in the hilly areas of Lazio Region, 44.9.% of 
small farms closed their operations in the eight-year period.  
 
In this scenario, the policy-makers are obviously worried about the future trends in small-scale, 
family farming. In particular, farmers’ aging is regarded as a major concern and a key determinant 
of the decline of small farms. Older farmers are less able  to adapt their  strategies to the new 
economic environment, and have a shorter time horizon that discourages new investments. Entrant 
farmers are, on average, younger and more innovative then the incumbents and are more suited to 
take the challenges of the market. From this perspective, the incentives to farmers’ turnover can 
improve the competitiveness of small farms. Installation payments (i.e, a lump-sum transfer of max 
55,000 euros to young farmers taking over a farming business has been The main policy measure 
that has been adopted in this regard). 
 
This paper focuses on the small farms of the Lazio region and uses micro-level data from 2007 
ISTAT farm structure sample (FSS) survey and an original dataset to investigate these trends and 
evaluate the success of turnover policies in facing the crisis of small farms. We found that, in the 
Lazio  region,  the  association  between  farmers’  turnover  and  new  investments  is  weaker  than 
expected, because of the presence of a non-negligible numbers of new farmers who disinvested. 
Consequently generational turnover has a smaller impact than expected. Also, we conclude that 
installation payments may not be an effective incentive to promote turnover. 
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  section  1  we  present  background  information  about  the 
general trends in the agriculture of the Lazio region, in section 2 we propose descriptive statistics 
illustrating the effects of farmers’ turnover and section 3 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND: SQUEEZE ON AGRICULTURE, GENERATIONAL TURNOVER 
AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES. 
 
In the last decades the farms of the Lazio region have change dramatically to meet the challenges of 
an  evolving  economic  and  social  environment.  New  organizational  models  and  new  issues  in agriculture  arose,  following  the  decoupling  of  agricultural  policy,  the  evolving  consumer 
preferences, the new links between farming and the rural environment, the restructuring of the agri-
food  chain  and  many  other  determinants  that  are  deeply  affecting  the  way  farmers  run  their 
operations. Although a thorough and complete analysis of the economic scenario for the Lazio 
agriculture goes beyond the scope of this paper, the main issues can be effectively summarized into 
the notion of squeeze on agriculture, which is the steady increase of the competitive pressure that is 
exerted on farmers. Originally, the notion has been developed in the ‘60s to describe the issues 
arising from the faster increase of input prices compared to the growth of agricultural commodities 
prices (Gruen 1970; Owen 1966). More recently, agricultural economists have applied this notion to 
the increasing difficulties in competing that farmers have been facing since late ‘80s (Ploeg et al. 
2000).  Such  squeeze  took  the  form  of  a  rapid  increase  in  factor  prices  (including  farmers’ 
reservation  salary)  and  a  sluggish  trend  in  commodity  prices,  due  –  among  other  factors  –  to 
agricultural policy decoupling. The constant reduction of profit margins from farming activities has 
determined an increasing difficulty in covering fixed costs and the reservation salary. To escape the 
squeeze,  the  farming  sector  has  developed  new  organizational  models.  For  instance,  both 
multifunctional activities and the industrialization of production can be considered as examples of 
the great diversity of reactions to the increasing competitive pressure.  
 
From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  agricultural  economists  debate  if  the  squeeze  on  agriculture  has 
determined either a change in the farming paradigm or a boundary shift of farming activities (e. g.  
Goodman 2004; Ploeg  and Renting 2004). For our  purposes, it is sufficient  to remark  that, in 
general, the increasing competitive pressure resulted in a greater diversity in the organizational 
models of farms (e. g., Ploeg 2005). The squeeze on agriculture did not force Lazio farms toward a 
single organizational model; empirical studies have shown that a great diversity of strategies have 
been adopted by farmers to face the evolving economic environment (Russo and Sabbatini 2005). 
 
Competitive pressure had a strong impact on Lazio farms. Table 1 summarizes the variation in the 
number of farms, total farmland and average farmsize between the last agricultural census (2000) 
and the last available FSS (2007). The number of farms dropped by 36.7% and the total cultivated 
farmland decreased by 4.7%. The decline in farm number results in a increase of the average farm 
size that goes from 4,4 hectares to 6,6. This result is driven by the heavy losses among small farms 
(-41,5) that almost halved in number over the seven-year period. In general, large farms (larger than 
20 ha) increase in number, but slightly decrease in average size. The net effect is a slightly increase in total farmland held by large farms. Table 1 shows that the trend is not homogeneous across the 
region.  
 
Table 1: Number of farms, total farmland (Ha) and average farmsize (Ha/farm) per altimetric 
zone, and dimensional class (years 2000 and 2007) 
Year 2000  Year 2007  Var. % 2000-2007  
Dimensional class  












Mountain  -| 5   26,749  31,292  1.2  17,003  25,617  1.5  -36.4  -18.1 
   5 -| 20   2,169  19,486  9  1,968  18,033  9.2  -9.3  -7.5 
   > 20  534  97,708  183  711  138,250  194.4  33.1  41.5 
   Tot. Mountain  29,452  167,971  5.7  19,682  181,900  9.2  -33.2  8.3 
 
Hill  -| 5   99,799  130,334  1.3  55,028  100,582  1.8  -44.9  -22.8 
   5 -| 20   10,324  92,874  9  9,624  88,895  9.2  -6.8  -4.3 
   > 20  2,859  196,339  68.7  2,852  177,250  62.1  -0.2  -9.7 
   Tot. Hill  112,982  419,547  3.7  67,504  366,726  5.4  -40.3  -12.6 
 
Plain  -| 5   14,628  25,752  1.8  10,527  21,067  2  -28  -18.2 
   5 -| 20   3,836  34,980  9.1  3,720  33,701  9.1  -3  -3.7 
   > 20  1,076  78,122  72.6  1,139  70,617  62  5.9  -9.6 
   Tot. Plain  19,540  138,854  7.1  15,386  125,385  8.1  -21.3  -9.7 
 
Lazio  -| 5   141,176  187,378  1.3  82,558  147,266  1.8  -41.5  -21.4 
   5 -| 20   16,329  147,340  9  15,312  140,629  9.2  -6.2  -4.6 
   > 20  4,469  372,169  83.3  4,702  386,116  82.1  5.2  3.7 
   Tot. Lazio  161,974  706,886  4.4  102,572  674,011  6.6  -36.7  -4.7 
Source: ISTAT, V General Census of Agriculture 2000, FSS 2007 
 
In 2007, the percentage of young farmers (i.e. less than 41 years old) in the Lazio region was 6.3%, 
sharply declining compared to 2000 (when it was 10.4). In the same year, the percentage of farmers 
65 years old or older was 55,8%.. In this perspective, it becomes clear why aging is considered a 
major problem for Lazio agriculture. To favor turnover and help young farmers to start a new 
business, the regional Rural Development Plan has designed an incentive policy based on Reg. 
1974/2006 (EC). The policy (the so-called measure 112) consists of two major tools: a lump-sum 
transfer of a maximum of €40.000 and interest rate subsidies of a maximum of €30.000. The two 
measures are cumulative up to a maximum of €55.000. The beneficiaries are young farmers (age 
between 18 and 40) who have certified competencies in agriculture and submit a business plan. The 
plan must: 
•  Be consistent with the objectives of the regional rural policy; •  Include  a  detailed  description  of  the  investments  aiming  at  improving  the  business 
performances in terms of income, production quality, environmental impact and animal 
welfare. 
The  stated  objective  of  the  policy  is  to  give  incentive  to  generational  turnover  in  agriculture, 
favoring  new  investments  and  innovation.  However  vast  anecdotal evidence  suggested that  the 
installation payments did not achieve the objectives. Cases have been reported that although the 
legal ownership of the farm has been transferred, the management is still in the hands of elder 
generations. 
 
2. GENERATIONAL TURNOVER AND POLICY: A SURVEY 
In order to investigate the effectiveness of the regional policy we run an ad-hoc sample survey 
involving 524 farms. The sample is representative of the Lazio universe at 96% confidence level. 
The survey was designed to collect data about expectations, investment intentions, generational 
turnover and socio-economic characteristics of the farm. In order to ensure a comparison with the 
FSS survey, the data of our survey refer to 2007. The joint interpretation of the FSS data and our 
original dataset allows us to evaluate the major trends in Lazio agriculture. In particular, we aim to 
find out i) if the current trends will continue in the future, ii) if there is an association between 
farmers’ aging and the probability of shutting down the farm operation, iii) the basic mechanism of 
the generational turnover in the Lazio region. 
 
2.1 Will the downfall slow down? Turnover expectations in the short run 
The sample survey shows that 10,8% of Lazio farmers plans to quit farming in the next 3 years 
(Table 2). The result is consistent with the trend of the last seven years. The decision of giving up 
farming in the short run does not seem to be associated with old age. In particular 10.8% of young 
farmer is planning to quit: a percentage that is only slightly lower than elder farmers. 
 
Table 2: Time horizion of the farming activities broken down by farmers’ age 
  Age of Farmers 
The Farmer plans to 
40 years or 
younger 
Between 41 
and 60  61 or older  No answer  Total 
Quit farming in 3 years  10.8  8.5  13.1  0.2  10.8 
Quit between 3 and 10 years     11.4  19.7     14.8 
Keep farming for at least 10 years  28.3  10.6  5.1  0.0  8.7 
Keep farming until retirement  13.6  11.9  8.3     10.0 
Doesn’t have a plan  26.0  30.1  26.6  0.0  27.7 
No answer  21.2  27.6  27.1  99.8  27.9 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 The  decision  of  giving  up  farming  has  a  negative  association  with  the  degree  of  “financial 
satisfaction” of the farmer. 98% of farmers planning to quit in the short run is unsatisfied or very 
unsatisfied of the financial performance of the farming operations (Table 3). 
Table  3:  Time  horizon  of  the  farming  activities  broken  down  by  degree  of  financial 
satisfaction 
 
Is the farmer satisfied of the financial performance of 
your farm?   
The Farmer plans to 
Very 
Unsatisfied  Unsatisfied  Satisfied 
Very 
satisfied  No answer  Total 
Quit farming in 3 years  53.3  44.7  2.0    0.1  100.0 
Quit between 3 and 10 years  24.5  56.7  16.4  2.4    100.0 
Keep farming for at least 10 years  8.1  61.8  29.6  0.5    100.0 
Keep farming until retirement  46.8  38.0  15.2  0.0  6.5  100.0 
Doesn’t have a plan  21.9  38.4  39.7    8.3  100.0 
No answer  42.0  37.3  20.7    11.6  100.0 
Total  30.6  41.4  22.0  0.4  5.6  100.0 
 
The joint interpretation of Table 2 and Table 3 suggests that the sharp decline in the number of 
farms is not due to aging alone, but has relevant economic motivations. Competitive pressure and 
bad financial performance of Lazio farms give farmers incentive to give up the operations looking 
for better alternatives. 
 
The decision of abandoning the farming activities is associated with farm size. Table 4 shows that 
in the short run the highest percentages of turnover are expected in the farm-size classes between 5 
and 15 hectares (21.6%) and larger than 30 hectares (16.3%). Small farms have a remarkably lower 
turnover expectation of 9.1. This result suggests that, after the big shock at the beginning of 2000’s, 
the declining trends for small farms may be slowing down. Table 4 also shows that the short run 
turnover will determine the redistribution of 11% of total Lazio farmland; this result suggests that 
the efficiency of the land market is a key issue in the region.  
  
Table 4: Time horizon of farming activities broken down by size of the farm. 
  Farm Size (ha)     
The Farmer plans to  0 - 5 ha  5,01 - 15  15,01 - 30 
Larger 
than 30  total 
% of total 
farmland 
Quit farming in 3 years  9.1  21.6  6.4  16.3  10.8  11.0 
Quit between 3 and 10 years  14.2  21.8  8.4  4.4  14.8  11.3 
Keep farming for at least 10 years  7.6  11.8  20.0  13.0  8.7  9.9 
Keep farming until retirement  10.3  6.4  10.2  20.0  10.0  12.4 
Doesn’t have a plan  27.5  24.3  39.7  37.7  27.7  39.6 
No answer  31.3  14.1  15.3  8.6  27.9  15.7 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Table 5 shows that 35.6% of the farmers that will retire in the next three years does not plan to sell 
or give away the farm. This behavior may find a rationale considering both the residential function 
of the farm and the structure of the single payment scheme, which may grant a small rent to the 
retiring farmers. Given the small average size of these operations (1.9 hectares) the farmland that is 
expected to be retired from production is 2.2% of the total. This result is consistent with the 2000-
2007 trends identified by ISTAT. 
Table  5:  Turnover  expectations  and  investment/divestment  plans  (data  expressed  as  a 
percentage of the total number of farms belonging to the class of turnover expectations; the 


























Quit farming in 3 
years 
31.7  0.0  2.0  3.6  11.7  11.3  35.6  16.1 
Quit between 3 
and 10 years 
66.7  8.4  17.9  2.4  5.6  4.2  5.1  16.8 
Keep farming for 
at least 10 years 
71.1  2.3  35.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  17.0 
Keep farming 
until retirement 
83.5  4.7  21.3  0.0  0.0  1.6  0.0  2.1 
Doesn’t have a 
plan 
78.5  3.0  8.4  0.6  4.9  0.3  1.1  6.1 
No answer 
62.7  0.1  7.7  1.1  0.0  0.4  5.3  25.4 
Total 
67.1  2.8  12.5  1.2  3.4  2.2  6.4  14.7 
 
2.2 Effects of generational turnover. 
The data from ISTAT FSS show that in the time period 2000-2007 only 2.3% of the farm had a 
generational turnover (Table 6).
1 In the same period 7.7% of farmers moved from young to mature 
age class. The data shows that the generational turnover is not sufficient to offset the ageing in 
Lazio agriculture. 
Table 6: percent frequencies of farms per age class in 2000 and 2007 (the data excludes new 
farms and incorporated farms)  
    Age of farmers in 2007 
    <=40  >40  Total 
<= 40  3.7  7.7  11.3 
>40  2.3  86.3  88.7 
Age of 
farmers in 
2000  Total  6.0  94.0  100.0 
                                                 
1 The percentage was calculated excluding new farms and incorporated farms  
The data suggest that in many cases the retiring farmers have been replaced with people of the same 
generation. To test this hypothesis the ad-hoc survey collected specific data about change in farm 
management between 2000 and 2007.  






effect  Ageing  No answer  Total 
Ouside family  19.4  3.4  7.6  -  30.4 
Within the family  2.3  55.3  -  -  57.6 
No answer  0.9  0.0  -  11.1  12.0 
Total  22.6  58.7  7.6  11.1  100.0 
 
Our data estimate that 9.1% of the existing farms in 2007 had changed the farmer in the previous 
seven years. Table 7 shows that 57.6% of the new farmers belong to the same (extended) family of 
the previous farmers, almost twice as much the farms that have been sold to non-family member. 
Only in 22.6% of the cases the change in management resulted in a generational turnover (i.e. the 
new farmer was at least 20 years younger than the retiring one). The change in management had no 
generational effect in 58.7% of the cases.  
The survey showed that 44.7% of the new farmers was already working in the same farm before 
taking over the management. In these cases the change in management can be considered as the 
result of a long process in which ownership is transferred only after a sort of “apprenticeship” (see 
for example Pesquin, Kimhi and Kislev 1999). Consequently focusing on the change in ownership 
when analyzing the turnover may be misleading because the “new” farmer is likely to be already 
active  in  the  farm.  This  result  may  also  imply  that  change  in  ownership  may  not  necessarily 
increase the propensity to innovation, because in almost half of the cases the new farmer was 
already working in the farm. 
Our survey shows that new farmers are, on average, more satisfied of the financial performances of 
their farm operations. Table 8 shows that, in percentage, the degree of satisfaction of financial 
performance is higher in the case of change of management. However, financial satisfaction is 
lower when the change in management determines a generational turnover. This result may imply 
that farming operations may fail to meet the income expectation of young farmers. Table 8: Degree of satisfaction of the financial performances of farm operations per type of 
turnover 
  Is the farmer satisfied of the financial performances? 
  No answers  Very unsatisfied  Unsatisfied  Satisfied  Very satisfied  Totale 
No Change    5.9  31.6  41.1  21.0  0.4  100.0 
Change in management  0.0  8.8  47.0  43.4  0.9  100.0 
             
Generational turnover  0.0  13.6  54.5  28.1  3.9  100.0 
Within the family  0.0  13.7  47.2  39.1  0.0  0.0 
 
Table 9: Percentage of farms with increase or decrease of farmland greater than 15% in the 
period 2000-2007 and average increase or decrease (Ha) per age of farmers. 
% of farms with increase in farmland > 15%    % of farms with decrease in farmland > 15% 
    Age of farmer in 2007        Age of farmer in 2007 
    <=40  >40  Total        <=40  >40  Total 
<=40  19.7  24.4  22.9   <=40  23.9  23.3  23.5 




2000  Total  23.8  19.4  19.7 
 
Age of farmer in 2000 
Total  24.9  23.0  23.1 
 
Average increase in farmland  
for farms with increase in farmland > 15% 
  Average decrease in farmland  
for farms with decrease in farmland > 15% 
    Age of farmer in 2007        Age of farmer in 2007 
    <=40  >40  Total        <=40  >40  Total 
<=40  1.5  0.5  0.8   <=40  -0.5  -0.3  -0.4 




2000  Total  1.0  0.3  0.3 
 
Age of farmer in 2000 
Total  -1.4  -0.3  -0.4 
 
The effects of generational turnover per se on investments may be ambiguous. If we consider farm-
size as a proxy for total capital investment, we have that 30.1% of farms with generational turnover 
increased their farm-size by more than 15% after the change in management and 26.5% decreased 
their investment in farmland by at least 15% (Table 9). In both cases the percentage is above the 
sample weighted average, suggesting that generational turnover do increase the probability of farm 
restructuring. However the new organization may involve a substantial divestment from the farm 
operation (on average -2.6 hectares). 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In the seven-year period from 2000 to 2007 the number of farms in the Lazio region decreased 
dramatically.  The  magnitude  of  the  decline  and  the  fact  that  it  concerned  mostly  small  farms 
questioned the persistence of family farming in the area, especially giving the aging of the resilient 
farmers. We used official statistics by ISTAT and an original dataset to assess if the declining trend is expected to slow down in the short run and if generational turnover can improve the performance 
of the agricultural sector. 
 
Our data suggested that the overall declining trend is expected to continue at least until 2010. 
Although the rate of decrease of small farm is expected to slow down, acceleration in the decrease 
of medium farms will keep the trend approximately at the same magnitude. The decline is not 
determined  by  aging  alone.  Instead,  unsatisfactory  financial  performance  and  increasing 
competitive pressure seem to be the main determinants of the phenomenon. 
 
Generational turnover is slow in the Lazio Region. In a eight-year period, only 2.3% of the farms 
changed a  over-40 manager with a new, under-40  one.  Moreover,  generational turnover is  not 
associated  with a  higher  degree  of  economic  satisfaction,  once  we  controlled for  the  effect  of 
change  in  ownership.  In  the  26.5%  of  the  cases,  generational  turnover  was  associated  with  a 
substantial divestment from farm  operation (i.e., more  than  15% of farmland, -1.4 hectares on 
average). This result suggests that generational turnover is not a solution per se, because a relevant 
part of the new generations are not willing to invest in the farming business. 
 
 The regional agricultural policy consider generational turnover as a priority, under the assumption 
that  young  farmer  are  more  efficient,  more  willing  to  invest  and  more  able  to  deal  with  the 
competitive pressure. The most important policy tool is the installation payments, i.e., lump-sum 
transfers to new farmers under 40 years of age. In order to avoid financing those new farmers that 
plan to divest, the payments are conditioned to a business plan that is consistent with the regional 
rural development objectives. Our analysis suggests that these payments may fail to achieve the 
objective for the following reasons: 
1.  The policy is costly to monitor, because it is costly to control that the farmers’ business 
plans are actually implemented.  
2.  The  decision  of  abandoning  farming  operations  is  driven  by  financial  determinants.  A 
potential new farmer may not considered a single lump-sum transfer sufficient to change 
his/her allocation of capital and personal labor resources, especially if the reservation salary 
is high. 
3.  The timing of the payment may be late. In approximately 44% of the cases, the change in 
ownership happens as the result of a sort of “association” of the new farmer, who has been 
already working in the farm for a long time. In these cases the responsibilities are gradually 
transferred and the change in management is just the last step of a long process. In these situations,  obviously,  the  investment  decisions  are  taken  long  before  the  installation 
payments happen.   
In our opinion, policies aimed at improving the overall financial performance of farms are already 
more effective incentives to generational turnover than installation payments. These policies are 
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